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by I an Harris
Readers may be familiar with two 
general accounts of the US Constitution. 
One is Ronald Dworkin's, set out 
especially in freedom's law (Oxford & 
New Ibrk, 1996). This suggests that the 
Constitution contains moral principles. 
The other is 'Original Intention', which
o
argues that the only proper reading of the 
Constitution is its meaning to its framers. 
These are two very different ways of 
looking at the Constitution. The purpose 
of this article is to suggest that both 
require qualification, and it proposes a 
third way to read the Copnstitution, 
combining respect for the historical 
document with a principled account of 
its significance.
DWORKIN'S READING
For Dworkin, the Constitution 
embodies principles as well as 
institutional requirements, and the 
relation between principle and law 
becomes highly significant. His wTitings 
suggest that this is one in which crucial 
laws derive from principle. For instance, 
Dworkin states that the Constitution, in 
the First Amendment, 'recoanizes a moraJ 
princip/e' and that this principle it has 
'incorporated* info ylmerican /aw' (freedoms 
law, p. 2). Thus '[we] are^oyemed" by... tne 
princip/es' that 'our /awma^ers' Vaid" down' 
(p. 10), whilst the Bill of Rights 'can on/y 
be understood" a; a jet of mora/ principles' 
(p. 10). Such principles, set in legal form, 
confer rights. Thus the First Amendment
O
is amongst laws that 'decJare ind"iyid"ua7 
ri^nts against ^oyemment' (p. 2), and the 
Fourteenth Amendment is understood to 
prescribe a right, as it:
'command's "eaua/" protection of tne Jaws, 
and" a7so command; tnat neifner /i/e nor Yiberty 
nor property be faAen witnout Wue' process of 
7a*y.' (R Dworkin, freed'om's law; p. 72)
Thus, for Dworkin, the Constitution 
contains moral principles, which, once 
understood, give rise to legal prescriptions 
that include the deliberate conferral of 
rights, let this is not an adequate reading 
* of the text of the Constitution.
Rather, we can posit principles 
consonant with the Constitution. For the
terms of the document of 1787 and the 
Bill of Rights, where thev are notO ' ^
institutional stipulations, are mostly 
prohibitions: most of them do not 
explicitly state moral principles and do 
not explicitly command rights. This is to 
make two points. First, one of the more 
trying features of prohibitions is that it is 
difficult to infer what principle produces 
a prohibition if we make our inferences 
from the latter alone, because any 
prohibition may be consistent with 
several principles. Thus a prohibition by 
itself affords insufficient information to 
disclose from which principle it derives, 
if indeed it derives from any In other 
words, the prohibitions of the 
Constitution do not have a logically 
transparent relationship to moral 
principles.
This brings us to our second point. 
Prohibitions do not explicitly prescribe 
rights. It is not transparently obvious that 
a right to something to which reference is 
made in a prohibition can be inferred 
from that prohibition alone. Certainly 
the Constitution does not prescribe 
rights (with some exceptions to which we 
shall come shortly) and a jortiori it does 
not do so in terms of moral principles. 
Instead it refers to rights which it does 
not prescribe, or, in the language of the 
Bill of Rights, it enumerates them. So it is 
not clear that, in general, the 
Constitution 'commands' rights. It is 
true that there are exceptions in the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments, but the 
difference in form between these and the 
other amendments indicates a difference 
of content. These examples of 
constitutional prescription are presented 
as such explicitly, which implies that 
those parts of the Bill of Rights presented 
otherwise are not prescriptions.
Dworkin writes that the framers of the 
Constitution:
'intended to commit tne nation to abstract 
principle.; of po/itica/ mora/ity about speecn 
and" punisnment and" eaua/ity, Jor example.' 
(p. 294)
Does this view afford a way of 
interpreting the general purposes that the
Constitution serves   that is to say, in 
Dworkin's broad formula 'wnaf tbeyramers 
intended" to jay'? (p. 13). If so, one may 
wonder why they did not say it 
themselves. But is there a better 
alternative? Certainly, an alternative has 
been offered, but examination does not 
suggest that it is better.do
'ORIGINAL INTENTION*
Dworkin's moral reading contrastsO
with another view. The theory of original 
intention refers to the framers' own 
expectations as the proper criterion to 
interpret the Constitution. This view^ 
plainly, is liable to a serious practical 
objection. Whilst historians, doubtless, 
should explain how the Constitution 
originated at least partly in terms of what 
the framers intended, lawyers need to 
apply the Constitution to contemporary 
circumstances. If we reject the original 
intention view, where do we go? Dworkin 
reports that Americans seek a third way, 
alternative both to his version of a moral 
reading and to original intention, but he 
suggests that such a third way cannot be 
found (p. 14).
A THIRD WAY
There is a third way. It agrees with 
Dworkin in reading the Constitution 
with reference to principles, and with 
'original intention' that its historical 
content be respected. The third way is to 
pay attention to the most fundamental, 
yet perhaps the most neglected, part of 
the Constitution.
The Constitution has a preamble 
which sets out very clearly the purposes 
of the framers. It runs thus:
'We, tne peop/e of tne [/S, in Order to 
jorm a more perfect [/nion, estab/isn Justice, 
insure domestic Tranaui/ity, proyiJeJor fne 
common defense, promote tne genera/ WeT/are, 
and" secure tne B/essinas of liberty to ourse/yes 
and" our Posterity, do ord"ain and" estab/isn tnis 
Constitution Jor tne [/nited* States oj America.
This is very different from the more 
specific provisions of the Articles of the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights and 
subsequent Amendments. 21
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PURSUING A THIRD WAY
The preamble helps Dworkin in that it 
provides a reading of the Constitution in 
terms of principles. It unmistakably 
specifies the general purposes for which 
the Constitution exists, by doing so 
provides principles, and these clearly 
require interpretation. That 
interpretation cannot be the one based 
on 'original intention', because these 
principles are so general that they defy 
limitation to any specific reference. The 
preamble was manifestly intended to 
have general significance, and to have 
indefinite duration, so that its original 
intention does not narrow down its 
content to a specific form. Indeed, it can 
provide grounds to amend the content of 
the Articles of the Constitution, because 
those Articles are terms to the objectives 
that it prescribes.
At the same time, the preamble is a 
hindrance to the 'moral reading' in the 
form Dworkin develops. He says that the 
Constitution includes 'abstract principles o^ 
poAtica/ moraAty'. But this is not a plausible 
reading of the Articles of 1787 or the Bill 
of Rights. The Articles consist of 
institutional stipulations while the Bill of 
Rights, besides these, consists ofo
prohibitions and denials, and certainly 
refers to or enumerates rights, but does 
not prescribe them (with the exceptions 
that we have seen). Neither do the 
subsequent Amendments alter the 
picture, for they likewise make 
prohibitions and specify institutional 
requirements. In short, the Bill of Rights, 
pace Dworkin, does not set out 'a network 
o/ principles' (p. 73) in his sense of 
'principle', that is to say prescriptive 
assertions of general moral truths; 
neither do the other Amendments or the 
original Articles, for none of them 'set 
out' principles of this sort. In Dworkin's 
sense, the only principles in the 
Constitution are those specified by the 
preamble.
As the preamble specifies the purposes 
for which the Constitution exists, it is 
hard to see how one can include within its 
scope anything that does not fall, 
explicitly or implicitly, under the purposes 
specified. Each category of the preamble, 
however, like the commandment, 'is 
exceeding broad'. Dworkin's principles 
may be brought within the remit provided 
by the preamble, but this is not to say that 




The Constitution nominates its own 
concerns in its preamble. We may need 
to supply further principles in order to 
articulate these, but the principles which 
the document itself provides do not 
correspond to all of Dworkin's headings 
of liberty, equality and community. 
Liberty is certainly present both in the 
preamble and in Dworkin, but equality 
and community are not given as
V O
categories by the former. However, they 
might be brought under its principles by 
some interpretative work. Thus the 
categories of 'general Welfare* ando c*
'Justice' might be interpreted in order to 
accommodate respectively community 
and equality. The interpretation is 
unlikely to be easy, however, because the 
relationship between justice and equality 
is, by any view, an involved one. Of 
course, we may need considerations of a 
higher generality than the principles of 
the preamble in order to rank or 
reconcile the latter if their requirements 
conflict, but it is not obvious that the 
members of Dworkin's trinity of liberal 
concern can fill this role plausibly: how 
could they regulate 'general Tranquility' 
and 'common defence'?
Rather, political morality needs to 
follow the categories of the preamble, 
and not the other way around, as it would 
in the Dworkin version (if the preamble 
figured at all there, which it does not). 
This is not to say that the Constitution 
requires no interpretation, but to 
observe the considerations that should 
govern the interpreting. For instance, the 
question ceases to be about whether the 
First Amendment is to be interpreted in 
terms of the principle 'fAat if is m-on^ Jor 
government to censor or control wAat inJiW Jua/ 
citizens say or pubAsA', as Dworkin hoped, 
and becomes a question, first, about 
which principle of the preamble the 
content of the Amendment fits 
appropriately   here, the answer is 
plainly 'secure fAe ^/essin^s oj liberty'; 
secondly, about what 'Blessings' and 
'Liberty' mean and, thirdly, about the 
sense or senses of 'tAe^reeJom o/ speecA, or 
o^tAe press' and whether they fall within 
the limits of 'the Blessings of Liberty'. 
The practical conclusions that flow from 
this are likely to differ from Dworkin's: 
few would maintain that pornography or 
neo-Nazi rallies, which he defends whilst 
he deplores, are 'Blessings of Liberty'.
It is not American liberalism alone that 
would be altered by this new reading. For 
example, a habit well beloved more 
generally in America would come under 
question. The Second Amendment   that 
'a weA* re^u/afed" MiAtia bein^ necessary to tAe 
security o^ajree .State, tAe ri^At o^tAe peopYe 
to Aeep and" bear /Irms sAaA* not be in/rin^ed" 
  has been taken as a general licence foro
private firearms. The most natural 
interpretation of this prohibition   that 
citizens should continue to have weapons 
in order that there should be a sufficiency 
of them practised in military skills to 
man a citizen army   implies that the 
right should be unimpeded to the extent 
that it facilitates a specific goal, rather 
than indicating that the Amendment
O
acknowledges an unqualified licence. 
This is, more importantly, a right that the 
development of more sophisticated 
military techniques has rendered 
obsolete for national defence. Though 
the Second Amendment made sense in 
its day as a means to 'the common 
defence', it is less obvious that the 
preamble nowadays admits such a 
practical inference; and it is not obvious 
that if arms produce violations of 
'domestic Tranquility' they should be 
permitted at all.
CONCLUSION
These examples suggest that the 
preamble to the Constitution implies 
radical alterations in American political 
attitudes. But, more germanely for the 
present purpose, its principles illustrate a 
mode of reasoning. The principles 
specified in the preamble provide topics 
which it is the business of legislators, 
judges and pundits to pursue. We need to 
reason from the principles of the 
preamble to the Articles of the 
Constitution and its Amendments, or to 
matters we suppose to be present among 
the unenumerated rights of the people, 
and thence to the bearing of such 
considerations on specific issues. In other 
words, we need to read the Constitution 
of the US in a new way. @
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